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Abstract The cloud computing paradigm is set to become the next explosive
revolution on the Internet, but its adoption is still hindered by security problems.
One of the fundamental issues is the need for better access control and identity
management systems. In this context, Federated Identity Management (FIM) is
identified by researchers and experts as an important security enabler, since it will
play a vital role in allowing the global scalability that is required for the successful
implantation of cloud technologies. However, current FIM frameworks are limited
by the complexity of the underlying trust models that need to be put in place before
inter-domain cooperation. Thus, the establishment of dynamic federations between
the different cloud actors is still a major research challenge that remains unsolved.
Here we show that risk evaluation must be considered as a key enabler in evidence-
based trust management to foster collaboration between cloud providers that belong
to unknown administrative domains in a secure manner. In this paper, we analyze
the Federated Identity Management process and propose a taxonomy that helps in
the classification of the involved risks in order to mitigate vulnerabilities and threats
when decisions about collaboration are made. Moreover, a set of new metrics is
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defined to allow a novel form of risk quantification in these environments. Other
contributions of the paper include the definition of a generic hierarchical risk
aggregation system, and a descriptive use-case where the risk computation frame-
work is applied to enhance cloud-based service provisioning.
Keywords Trust management  Cloud computing  Risk assessment metrics 
SAML  Federation
1 Motivation
The cloud computing paradigm is set to become the next explosive revolution on the
Internet. According to the definition of this model [1], resources are provisioned as a
service over the network, i.e., Software as a Service (SaaS), Platform as a Service
(PaaS) or Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS). Furthermore, four different deployment
models are contemplated: private, community, public, and hybrid clouds. Based on
this paradigm, users will enjoy on-demand network access to a shared pool of
configurable computing resources, such as networks, storage, services or applica-
tions that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort.
But, despite all these envisaged benefits, the adoption of cloud computing is still
hindered by security problems, as it has been widely emphasized in several recent
research works [2–4].
Among all these security issues, this paper treats the challenges posed by identity
management in the cloud [5], focusing on risk assessment. It is easy to see that
cloud environments involve multi-provider and multi-service scenarios. In this
context, new applications are likely to combine data from multiple cloud-based
sources, belonging to different domains, each of which has its own access control
mechanisms. Thus, it is desirable that users in one domain are able to access
applications hosted in another cloud—or domain—as long as a trust relationship
exists between the two cloud environments. Therefore, functionalities to manage the
flow of user identity (i.e., authentication, authorization and attribute data) across
clouds or domains are required. For this reason, a robust identity management must
be put in place for cloud deployment and interaction in a usable and secure way.
More specifically, federated identity management (FIM) is identified by researchers
and experts as an important security enabler, since it will play a vital role to allow
the global scalability that is required for the successful implantation of cloud
technologies. This topic has gained momentum and, in fact, several standardization
organisms and research initiatives involved in cloud computing have recently
included identity federation as an indispensable mechanism in its use-cases
documents and whitepapers [6–8]. Furthermore, the ‘‘Open Cloud Manifesto’’ states
that clouds have to dynamically scale up and down [9]. However, the main
drawback is that current FIM systems lack mechanisms to achieve dynamic
federation, which is still an open challenge that requires further investigation. We
previously identified this requirement in [10, 11] and we argue that risk assessment
must be incorporated in evidence-based trust management to allow agile cloud
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interaction without requiring static pre-configuration and to make dynamic
federation possible.
With these ideas in mind, we propose a novel taxonomy to identify risks in
federated identity management. Federation is one of the basic principles of cloud
computing [12] because this paradigm of computing requires strong integration,
cooperation and collaboration among different clouds. Furthermore, we also
introduce a set of metrics to make quantification possible, since this is currently one
of the more complex tasks in risk assessment. The proposed taxonomy aims to raise
the attention of the community and to serve as a foundation to identify and
investigate new metrics in FIM. Other contributions of the paper include the
definition of a hierarchical risk aggregation framework, and a descriptive use-case
scenario where our risk computation technique is applied to enhance cloud-based
service provisioning.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows: Sect. 2 provides background
knowledge regarding risk and identity management. Next, in Sects. 3 and 4, we
present a categorization of risks in FIM, and explain how to derive metrics for its
quantification. In Sect. 5, the proposed aggregation system is explained, followed by
an application scenario in cloud computing described in Sect. 6. Finally, Sect. 7
highlights the main related works, and Sect. 8 gives the principal conclusions and
future works.
2 Background Knowledge
2.1 On Risk
Due to the omnipresent character of risk, there are many definitions of the term
depending on specific applications and contexts. Despite the ambiguity of the word
and the lack of global consensus on the meaning, a good definition to understand the
concept could be the following: ‘‘the possibility of loss or injury’’ [13]; that is, the
probability of occurrence of undesirable outcomes. Mathematically, the most
common formula to formalize risk in quantitative terms is (1):
R ¼ P  I ð1Þ
that reflects that risk (R) is proportional to both the probability of an undesirable
event occurring (P) and the impact of this event (I). Usually the risk is composed by
a series of risks, each one referred to a possible negative output, as shown in (2):
TR ¼
X
i
Ri i ¼ 1; . . .; N ð2Þ
So, the total risk (TR) associated to a transaction is the combination of the risk
values of all the possible undesired events (Ri). The main recurrent issue in the risk
literature is quantification. The fundamental problem lies in the calculation of the
two magnitudes that contribute to risk. Thus, determining the rate of occurrence is
often complicated since statistical information is not available on all kinds of past
incidents. Furthermore, evaluating the impact of the consequences is also hard.
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It seems to be easier in areas related to economy, because the impact is propor-
tionally related to the investments, but the task of asset evaluation in other fields
gets relatively complex since resources other than money are hard to measure.
The first step for quantification is to collect data and extract significant numerical
values, the metrics, that could be used later together with statistics and probability
theory to conform a risk model. But metrology in Information Technology (IT) is
still emerging [14].
Here we define a taxonomy with the aim to help the risk metric identification
process in FIM. It constitutes a first effort to start quantification, following the
maxim of ‘‘If you cannot measure (or model) it, you cannot improve it.’’
2.2 On Federated Identity Management
Federated Identity Management (or FIM) refers to the technologies, standards and
use-cases that serve to enable the portability of identity information across
otherwise autonomous security domains [15]. The ultimate goal of identity
federation is to enable users of one domain to securely access data or systems of
another domain seamlessly and without the need for completely redundant user
administration.
The main actors in a FIM scenario are (1) the Identity Provider (IdP), which
vouches for the identity of a user and issues authentication, authorization and/or
attribute tokens about her; (2) the Service Provider (SP), which provides services to
the end user and relies on the identity tokens generated by the IdP; and (3) the User,
that interacts (usually via a user agent, e.g., web browser) with both SPs and IdPs.
In the particular context of cloud computing, the SPs are the cloud service
providers (which provide anything as a Service, i.e., XaaS); and the IdPs are those
entities that act as authoritative sources of identity data for users. Federation of
identities maintained by the multiple cloud SPs is crucial to allow flexible cloud-
based service composition and application integration. In fact, federation protocols
are currently used commercially by companies and government agencies to provide
cloud Single Sign-On (SSO) connections and security solutions to hybrid cloud
computing environments.
For scalability reasons, trust relationships between the involved actors1 should be
created on-demand instead of being statically defined previous to interaction, which
is the method currently used in FIM. However, there is a high uncertainty
component when deciding whether to cooperate or not with unknown parties. Thus,
every actor that participates in a FIM system has to make decisions that imply
dealing with some form of risk. An IdP may ask itself if it is secure to collaborate
with a particular unknown SP. Similarly, an SP will have to decide if it is secure to
accept authentication statements or other identity data issued by a specific IdP. And
finally, it is crucial that users are aware of the transactions regarding their identity.
In fact, they should be provided with some kind of risk information to determine if
they should reveal their personal data to an SP or IdP.
1 The term actors are used in accordance with definitions in [6].
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On the other hand, there are some subtleties inherently related to the term
federation in Identity Management scenarios that must be first clarified to properly
understand the proposed taxonomy. So, the verb federate, as defined in the Merriam
Webster Dictionary, means ‘‘To link or bind two or more entities together.’’ In the
context of our research, there are two possible senses in which the word federation
(and its variants) can be employed and still be consistent with the former definition.
According to it, we can talk about (a) federation, meaning the act of establishing a
relationship between providers; and (b) identity federation, that exists when there is
an agreement between various providers on a set of identifiers and/or attributes that
are used to refer to a subject (i.e., the user). Thus, an identity federation is not
possible if providers are not federated. But a provider federation depends on the
identity framework being used; it could be a trivial process, as occurs with OpenID
[16], where no trust model is required to cooperate; or an extremely complex task,
as happens with Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) [17] or Liberty
Alliance protocols [18], where contractual frameworks must be statically estab-
lished to set up a Circle of Trust (CoT).
So, once the shades in the meaning of the word federation have been clarified, the
principal division of the taxonomy can be understood.
3 Risk in FIM: A Taxonomy
Based on the reasoning in the previous section, we argue that Federated Identity
Management consists of two different phases that should be analyzed separately to
evaluate risks.
1. Pre-federation Phase (or federation between providers). This phase consists of
the establishment of a relationship between providers, which means deciding on
protocols to interoperate, agreeing on common rules and policies, etc.
Definitely, pre-federation can be understood as a Bootstraping Phase that
allows parties to gather information about each other and to initiate cooperation.
2. Post-federation Phase (or transactions between federated providers). This phase
contemplates the transactions between two federated entities (e.g., requesting
user attributes or accepting authentication claims). So, at this point, we have
basic information to support our decisions. At least, the deciding entity will
count with all the data derived from the Bootstrap Phase and, if more
interaction has taken place, it will also maintain a history of transactions. This
stage can be viewed as the Evolution Phase, since entities progressively
construct and consolidate their relationships, which fulfills the dynamic and
subjective nature of trust.
The decisions to make and the applicable information are different in each phase;
and so are the faced risks. In pre-federation, an entity will presumably have to
decide whether to establish a relationship for further cooperation with another
entity. The sources of information to compute a risk metric could be, for example,
the entity metadata [19], pre-configured relationships, policies, and the Service
Level Agreements (SLAs) being negotiated. On the other hand, metrics in the
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Post-Federation Phase can be calculated from the information available in the
assertions and protocols in use, the characteristics of the specific service transaction
in process, and also, by leveraging the risk metrics from the previous phase. The
distinction of these two fundamental phases in FIM constitutes the first level (L1) of
the proposed taxonomy, whose complete schematic is depicted in Fig. 1. In the
following subsections, we explain the different risk categories related to each phase
that are shown in the picture.
3.1 Pre-federation Risks
In order to establish a federation between providers, a set of agreements must be put
in place so a trust relationship can be created. For this purpose, there is not a
standard or common fixed set of minimum requirements. Instead, every deployment
follows its own rules based on the federation framework in use. After thoroughly
analyzing FIM specifications, best practices and recommendations [20] and
reviewing public data about how current federation deployments were established
[21], it can be concluded that the whole set of aspects to be considered before
creating a federation are oriented to achieve security and privacy objectives, to
establish operational rules and policies for legal compliance, as well as to define the
technical configuration required for communication. The taxonomy proposed here
aims to cover all these aspects in order to be generic enough to abstract all the
federation frameworks. According to this, we divide the next level (L2) of
classification in the pre-federation phase into three main blocks or categories;
Security and Privacy Risks, Knowledge Risks, and Interoperability Risks. Next, each
of these classes is explained in more detail.
The first class, Security and Privacy Risks, encompasses those risk metrics
related to the security and privacy features that are supported by an entity that wants
to establish a federation, located at level L3 in the taxonomy:
Fig. 1 Taxonomy for risk metric categorization in federated IDM
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• Confidentiality Disclosing information only to the intended and authorized
recipients;
• Integrity Guarding against improper information modification or destruction;
• Authentication Confirming something (or someone) as authentic, verifying the
validity of the claims made by or about the so called subject;
• Non-Repudiation Providing evidence that one party involved in a transaction
sent or received a message, so it cannot be denied;
• Availability Ensuring that a system is operational and that it is accessible to
those who need to use it, so the business purposes can be met; loss of availability
is often referred to as ‘‘denial-of-service’’;
• Accountability The ability to associate a consequence with a past action of an
individual. It is required that the individual can be linked to an action or event
for which he/she is to be held accountable;
• Privacy Appropriate use and protection of information; meaning seclusion and
selective disclosure of data according to law and policies. Privacy is sometimes
related to anonymity, defined as the wish to remain unnoticed or unidentified in
the public domain.
Each of the above basic security services or ‘‘CIA’’ (i.e., Confidentiality,
Integrity and Authentication) depends on the cryptographic characteristics of both
the data exchanged at the message level (ML) and at the transport layer level (TL).
In this regard, most of the FIM protocols strongly recommend the use of secure
communication protocols, such as Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) [17, 22]. Thus, it is
required to evaluate the quality of the security services that can be provided at the
message level and also with regard to the communication nature. For example, a
FIM transaction with encrypted assertions that are also transmitted over a secure
SSL connection would incur in less risks than if the communication channel is not
secured. This requirement is also reflected in the taxonomy, as a sub-classification
(at level L4) to be evaluated for each basic security service.
The second subclass under pre-federation, called Knowledge Risks, involves
those factors related to the previous information that is known about the other entity.
These metrics aid in the quantification of the initial trust level that is assigned, being
a point of relation between trust and risk. Since each party has to decide whether to
engage in a relation with the other party for future cooperation, it is reasonable to
gather information about its trustworthiness.
In order to capture the different types of relationships, Knowledge metrics are
sub-classified into Direct and Indirect. The Direct Knowledge metrics are related to
pre-configured relationships (e.g., digital certificates or business agreements);
whereas Indirect Knowledge refers to that information that can be inferred from
direct relationships in other contexts or obtained from external sources [23].
Consequently, the risk level will vary according to the existing knowledge, because
it is indirectly proportional to the uncertainty.
Finally, the last differentiation to allocate risk contributing factors in pre-
federation is named Interoperability Risks, which encompasses those issues related
to interworking between entities. Interoperability can be decomposed in three
different domains, located at level L3 in the taxonomy: Technical, Operational and
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Legal. The Technical category is required since there are many different
technologies for FIM. Furthermore, inside a specific framework there can be
different implementations. For example, two SAML enabled entities could not
interoperate if they do not support a set of common Profiles. Thus, metrics are
required in order to measure the technical compatibility of the systems. Apart from
technology related interoperability, it is also important to evaluate if the policies of
each entity are compatible to a certain degree. In this sense and on one hand, entities
should measure the interoperability regarding operational policies. On the other
hand, legal compliance and applicable jurisdictions should also be addressed, so
cooperation is also interoperable at the regulatory level. Therefore, if cooperation
implies risk of violating an entity policy, it should be avoided. Thus, the
interoperability metrics are computed based on the information gathered from
Metadata, SLAs, and policies of the other entity before deciding on interaction.
3.2 Post-federation Risks
After a federation between providers has been established, transactions to exchange
user identity data can be performed between them. In this phase, risk must be
evaluated on a per-transaction basis. As shown in Fig. 1, Post-Federation Risk
metrics can be categorized in three main classes; Security and Privacy Risks,
Service Specific Risks and Historical Interaction Risks.
In post-federation transactions it is relevant to measure how the security features
are fulfilled in order to know how they contribute to the total risk. Thus, the same
classification of Security and Privacy Risks made for pre-federation applies here.
The difference is that the Security and Privacy metrics taken in post-federation are
related to the current transaction, and so they are used to decide whether or not to
transact in the measured conditions. However, metrics in the pre-federation phase
are used to determine the global support of security features and decide whether to
federate or not.
Apart from the Security and Privacy related metrics, we consider a further
distinction in order to include Service Specific Risks and ensure completeness. This
category allows the risk model to be tailored for different types of services. Services
differ in characteristics such as required personal information, value of the resources
owned by the SP, importance of data availability and so forth. All these issues must
be considered by every member involved in a service transaction in order to create a
risk context and decide about proceeding with the transaction or not.
Finally, there is also a Historical Interactions Risks category to consider those
risk metrics related to the information and knowledge about the other entity
involved in the transaction. In this phase, in contrast to the pre-federation case, there
is another source to compute knowledge related metrics: the history of transactions.
As more transactions are performed, the entities will have a better direct knowledge
about the behavior of other entities. In addition, indirect knowledge could be
obtained in anomalous situations. Consequently, the involved risk level can be tuned
accordingly.
All the above distinctions are captured in the schematic of the taxonomy depicted
in Fig. 1. To summarize, the taxonomy is organized into two major classes:
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pre-federation and post-federation. These taxonomic classes are further divided into
the subclasses representing Security and Privacy Risks, Knowledge Risks,
Interoperability Risks, Service Specific Risks and Historical Interactions Risks.
Finally, the last levels contemplate the different dimensions in which every risk can
be evaluated. The taxonomy in Fig. 1 should be adopted by every entity in the
system to enrich its intelligence and independence and to be capable of making
well-informed decisions.
The classification compiles the characteristics of FIM systems and makes risk
decomposition in small subsets possible. Besides, it is generic enough to be
applicable to every federation framework (SAML, Liberty Alliance, OpenID, etc.),
since the provided abstraction levels allow to cover all the common features, as well
as the specific ones.
4 Risk Quantification: A Metric-Based Approach
In the following, we explain how to identify risk metrics using the taxonomy in
Fig. 1. For this purpose, we assume an SAML-based federated system. The main
goal is to identify independent terms that contribute to the computation of the
overall risk, as illustrated in formula (2), although other methods might be used
[24].
The first step is to choose a terminal node in the taxonomy tree, e.g., Post-
Fed ? Security and Privacy ? Confidentiality ? TL. For this selected category,
the possible threats can be derived. In this case, if no confidentiality is provided at
the transport level, the system could be subjected to eavesdropping attacks or
privacy violations. So, transport confidentiality yields a contribution to the
feasibility of the mentioned threats. However, the final risk will be affected by
other components, such as the confidentiality at the message level. Once we are
aware of the related risks, we can define a way to quantify relevant facts that relate
to them. In this example, the value of the confidentiality at the transport level can be
assigned depending on the cryptographic strength of the encryption algorithms
supported by the entity willing to federate. Thus, we finally came up with the
semantic definition of the metric, as shown in Table 1.
Following this strategy, we can identify more metrics. Another example is the
Level of Assurance or LOA (see Table 2). It is usually defined as the degree of
confidence in identifying an entity to which a credential was issued, and the degree
of confidence that the entity using the credential, is indeed the entity that the
credential was issued to. For example, the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) [25] defines four discrete levels that are associated with the
Table 1 Definition of the confidentiality-transport level metric
Metric Confidentiality—transport level (CONFTL)
Definition Measures confidentiality of information exchanged at transport level,
depending on the encryption algorithm (e.g., based on strength, key size)
Considerations Inversely proportional to risk. Source: Entity Metadata [19]
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strength of the authentication methods. This way, simple password challenge-
response is categorized as LOA level 1, and hard cryptographic tokens are
considered level 4. The LOA, which falls into the Post-Fed ? ServiceSpec
category, is a clear example of an existing concept that fits into the taxonomy and
can be used as a risk metric in FIM. Thus, the value expressed by the LOA metric
can be used by providers to decide whether an individual should be granted access
to specific protected resources or if a higher LOA is required.
The purpose of the taxonomy is to serve as a reference framework to better
understand the process of federation and identify the different aspects that need to
be taken into account when building trust and analyzing the possible risks. There are
existing defined metrics that are applicable to FIM infrastructures, and new tailored
ones can be created for specific service necessities. So far, the set of basic metrics
that we have derived from the taxonomy and that can be incorporated in the risk
aggregation system described in Sect. 5 are summarized in Table 3.
The degree in these metrics represents the probability value (P) in formula (1). So
in a first approach, we consider the impact (I) as a constant estimated value for each
interaction applied according to the sensitivity of the services and resources that
potentially could be affected.
So far, we have provided a semantic high-level definition of the metrics, and
assigned a linguistic scale to each one in the next section. However, we do not
specify how to calculate the numeric values to be mapped in these scales.
5 Hierarchical Risk Aggregation
5.1 Architecture
Apart from serving as a basis for deriving risk metrics, the taxonomy can be used to
define an aggregation model for risk calculation. Its hierarchical structure makes it
suitable to be the foundation of a hierarchical aggregation system. This is an
important advantage since multicriteria decision making (MCDM) mechanisms and
related mathematical techniques (such as Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) [28])
rely on the decomposition of problems into a hierarchy of more easily compre-
hended sub-problems, each of which can be analyzed independently.
Thus, with the aim to apply the defined taxonomy to compute the total risk in the
different phases of FIM, we have designed a generic hierarchical aggregation
system that is comprised of the following elements:
Table 2 Definition of the level of assurance (LOA) metric
Metric Level of assurance (LOA)
Definition The LOA measures the degree of confidence in identifying an entity to whom a
credential was issued
Considerations Inversely proportional to risk. Source: can be obtained from the SAML Authentication
Assertion, either directly [26] or by calculating it from the Authentication Context
[27]
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• Input Source Data The input data that will be employed to extract appropriate
metrics for risk calculation. The model contemplates external data sources, such
as messages and SLAs, as well as internal data sources, such as trust lists or local
policies.
• Risk Metric Extractor This component processes the input data and derives the
low level risk metrics that will be subsequently used to compute the final risk
value.
• Aggregation Engines These modules are in charge of taking separate risk
contributing factors and applying an aggregation function to combine them in a
single value. The system contains an aggregation engine per each category in the
taxonomy.
We adopt the following notation: each element in the taxonomy is called a risk
category (e.g., Security and Privacy Risks, Knowledge Risks…) and the risk value
associated to a specific category is calculated by combining the risk values
associated to its sub-categories that are located in a lower level. According to these
Table 3 Basic set of metrics for risk quantification in FIM
Category (L2) Metric
name
Description
Security and
privacy
CONFTL,
CONFML
Measure confidentiality degree of information exchanged at transport
level and message level, respectively
INTTL,
INTML
Measure integrity degree of information exchanged at transport level and
message level, respectively
AUTHTL,
AUTHML
Measure authentication degree of information exchanged at transport
level and message level, respectively
NON-REP Measures the degree of non-repudiation
ACC Measures the degree of accountability
AV Measures the degree of availability
LOP Level of protection measures the degree of data protection that either an
IdP or a SP provides for identity information entrusted to them by a
user
Interoperability INTEROPT Measures the degree of technical interoperability between the involved
parties
INTEROPO Measures the degree of interoperability between the operational policies
of the involved parties
INTEROPL Measures the degree of interoperability between the legal policies of the
involved parties
Knowledge KNOWD Measures the degree of direct knowledge about the other party
KNOWI Measures the degree of indirect knowledge about the other party
Service
specific
SLOs,
LOA
Service Level Objectives (SLOs) define characteristics of a service in
precise, measurable terms (each service should define its own specific
metrics, e.g., throughput, bandwidth)
Level of Assurance (LOA) measures the degree of confidence in
identifying an entity to whom a credential was issued
Historical
interactions
HINT Measures the posteriori probability of interactions
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definitions, Fig. 1 and formula (3) illustrate the basic building blocks of the
hierarchical aggregation model. Essentially, the risk associated to category i at level
j (Ri
j) is obtained by aggregating the k contributory factors that are a sub-category of
i in the immediate lower level (Rk
j?1), and each of those can be further partitioned
into these lower level contributory factors:
R ji ¼ AggðRjþ1k Þ; k ¼ 1; . . .; N k8subcategoryðiÞ ð3Þ
The aggregation function (Agg) may be selected according to the policies of the
entity that calculates risk. Next, we particularize the hierarchical risk system by
applying a specific aggregation technique in order to show how risk computation is
performed.
5.2 Particularizing the System: The Fuzzy Aggregation Case
Aggregation refers to the fusion of several input values into a single and meaningful
output value, and aggregation operators are the mathematical objects to achieve this
task. Since aggregation is an indispensable tool of the majority of engineering,
economic, social and other sciences, extensive research has been conducted in the
field [29].
On the other hand, it is remarkable the applicability of fuzzy logic [30] and
related aggregation functions in fields where uncertainty and imprecision play a
relevant role. In order to aggregate fuzzy sets, there are also numerous specific
operators that have been proposed in the literature, e.g., fuzzy t-norms (intersection,
minimum, product) and fuzzy s-norms (union, maximum, summation). The
selection of an aggregation operator will depend on the context where it is applied.
In [31], detailed discussions on the election of appropriate operators are presented.
In our case, we will use fuzzy techniques to perform aggregation in the context of
the presented hierarchical risk system. The application of fuzzy logic to risk seems
appropriate, since this kind of analysis is subjective and related to uncertain and
incomplete information.
So, in order to construct a fuzzy inference system (FIS), the following steps are
performed (1) Fuzzification, that is comprised of the definition of the input and
output parameters and their associated levels or linguistic labels; (2) Definition of
If–Then Rules that will be used for reasoning about input values and obtain the
output; and (3) Deffuzification, that refers to the calculation of a single output
number after the rules are applied.
It is worth noting that due to the hierarchical nature of the proposed risk
aggregation system, different fuzzy inference systems are used to aggregate
individual risk categories at each level in the taxonomy. Next, these blocks, which
we have previously termed aggregation engines, are cascade interconnected in order
to obtain the final global output.
Thus, for calculating the total risk in the pre-federation phase, we start by
defining a first FIS, the Confidentiality Aggregation Engine, with the input variables
Confidentiality at transport level and Confidentiality at message level (based on
metrics CONFTL, CONFML), and output variable Confidentiality Risk. Similarly,
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the rest of FIS systems are created at the taxonomy Level L3 by using the metrics
defined in Sect. 4 as inputs. The outputs are used to feed the FIS systems at Level
L2: Security and Privacy Aggregation Engine, Interoperability Aggregation Engine
and Knowledge Aggregation Engine. And finally, the total pre-federation risk at
Level L1 is obtained by applying if–then rules to the Security and Privacy, as well
as the Interoperability and Knowledge outputs in Level L2.
As depicted in Fig. 2 we use three linguistic levels in the fuzzification procedures
(Low, Medium and High) both for input and output variables. However, both the
granularity of the scale, as well as the scoring system and mapping between metrics
and linguistic values, are to be defined by each party according to its necessities.
Figure 3 shows the logical model of one of the aggregator blocks, the Interoper-
ability Aggregation Engine, with the different input variables and the output of the
module.
As shown in Fig. 3, in order to obtain the final Interoperability Risk value, the
three input variables must be combined. And this combination is done based on a set
of predefined rules in the following form:
Fig. 2 Fuzzy linguistic scales for confidentiality variables. Similarly, a three level scale is also used in
the rest of input and output variables of the system
Fig. 3 Fuzzy-based aggregation engine to compute the Interoperability Risk value
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IF Technical Interoperability Risk IS {High, Medium, Low} AND
Operational Interoperability Risk IS {High, Medium, Low} AND
Legal Interoperability Risk IS {High, Medium, Low} THEN Interop-
erability Risk IS {High, Medium, Low}
Similarly, a whole set of if–then rules must be defined for the rest of the
aggregation engines. Thus, each entity has to describe its own rules in a policy
document, so that they can be automatically extracted and applied by the aggregator
engines. Finally, after applying the rules, the linguistic risk output is translated into
a numerical value (deffuzification) in order to be used in decision making by
comparing this number with internal pre-established risk thresholds in the system.
Although we have only described the system for pre-federation risk computing,
the case for post-federation is equivalent.
In the following section, we show how the proposed technique for risk
assessment is applied in a dynamic cloud federation use-case to demonstrate the
scope of application.
6 Application Scenario
In order to illustrate the applicability of our proposal, we present an example
scenario where risk-based decision making is used to allow dynamic cooperation
between previously unknown cloud providers. It shows how the application of risk
assessment allows a smooth and seamless experience to the end users.
We start from the use-case described in [6] where Alice, who is subscribed to her
own cloud storage provider (CSP), has created various files there that contain
personal data, one of which is her curriculum vitae (CV). Alice wishes to let Bob,
her friend, read her CV file so she needs to delegate ‘read access’ to him. But Bob is
not a subscriber to this particular cloud service provider, and has no wish to register
for yet another set of credentials for accessing yet another service.
However, Bob does have an account with an IdP that is part of the same
federation as the cloud storage provider, and is trusted to correctly authenticate Bob.
For this use-case to be possible they rely on the assumption that ‘‘Federated IDM is
already in place.’’
At this point, it is obvious that if the IdP belongs to the same federation of the
cloud storage provider because previous contracts and arrangements have been put
in place, there will be no problems. However, taking into account the multi-provider
and multi-service nature of cloud computing environments, it is reasonable to think
that both providers may be completely unknown.
In this case, a mechanism to allow a dynamic federation to be created on-demand
and driven by user needs is highly desirable. This is the problem we solve with this
proposal.
Let us now assume that the IdP and the CSP are unknown to each other. For this
particular example and for the sake of simplicity, let us also assume that both
providers are interoperable at every level: they are able to use the SAML FIM
protocol, they have indirect knowledge via digital certificates and their policies say
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that the only requirements to cooperate are related to the security of the
communication; more specifically, to the CIA metrics (i.e., confidentiality, integrity,
authentication.)
Thus, the new operation flow for dynamic federation introducing risk assessment
is comprised of the following steps:
1. Bob sends a Service Request to the cloud storage provider (CSP) in order to
access Alice’s CV.
2. The CSP discovers that Bob is not a registered user and that he prefers to be
authenticated by his IdP. But, since the CSP and the IdP are unknown to each
other, they will first evaluate the involved risks to decide on cooperation.
3. Thus, the pre-federation risk is computed at the SP using the proposed
hierarchical aggregation system based on internal data, such as local policies,
and also using gathered external data regarding Bob’s IdP (SLAs, metadata,
reputation data, etc.) In this particular example, the CSP only takes into account
the Security and Privacy Risk to make a decision, and its local policy says that
just Confidentiality, Authentication and Integrity Risks must be taken into
account. In Fig. 4, an example of SAML Metadata is shown that can be used as
input source data for the risk metric extractor to get the required metrics. This
Metadata document includes information regarding the cryptographic algo-
rithms supported by the entity to be used when signing and encrypting
messages. From this input data, the CIA metrics are derived and then mapped to
linguistic risk variables in the scale {Low, Medium, High}.
Assuming, again for simplicity, that only message level metrics are required,
aggregation will take place at the Security and Privacy Risk Aggregation Engine.
Regarding the logic if–then rules that are executed in aggregation, let us suppose
that the provider has decided to adopt the conservative risk approach that the
aggregated risk is always the maximum of the single contributing risks.
Accordingly, Table 4 summarizes the knowledge base used for the rules in the
Security and Privacy Risk Aggregation engine:
Thus, according to the set of defined if–then rules, Fig. 5 shows the risk surfaces
for the Security and Privacy Risk category obtained by combining all possible input
values in the lower level. As stated before, since we are assuming a conservative
policy, we can observe for example, that it is enough that one of the inputs is High
in order to determine that the output risk is High.
4. If the final risk value is assumable according to internal thresholds, then the
CSP assigns an initial trust to the IdP and a Federation Request is sent.
5. Since trust must be bilateral in a federation, the IdP would also evaluate the
risks regarding possible cooperation with the CSP, in order to establish trust and
decide on a federation.
6. If the calculated pre-federation risk is assumable by the IdP, then the federation
is completed and transactions between providers can be performed. The storage
provider will now accept authentication assertions about Bob, issued by the IdP,
so the users are capable to collaborate, and the files can be shared.
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Thus, the presented application scenario clearly illustrates how risk evaluation
contributes to enhance the current landscape in Cloud Identity Federation and makes
global scalability possible.
Table 4 Knowledge base used by the if–then rules in the security and privacy risk aggregation engine
Confidentiality risk Security and privacy risks Integrity risk
High High High High High
High High High High Medium
High High High High Low
Medium High High High High
Medium High Medium Medium Medium
Medium High Medium Medium Low
Low High High High High
Low High Medium Medium Medium
Low High Medium Low Low
Authentication risk High Medium Low
The table shows the final output value of the security and privacy risk for all possible combinations of the
three input variables (highlighted in italic)
Fig. 4 Example of partial metadata instance (taken from [32]) for a provider that supports a number of
signature and digest algorithms
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7 Related Work
Due to the increasing interest in the cloud computing paradigm, security is
becoming an important concern for researchers since it constitutes the main barrier
to adoption. Security surveys and recommendations are presented in [2, 33, 34].
Between the main security open issues, appropriate access control and identity
management systems are frequently referred to as key required mechanisms for data
protection in the cloud. In [35], the authors consider that the existing trusted third
party (TTP) protocols may provide at least part of the security solution for cloud
services, which supports the idea of using Single Sign-on models based on FIM
technologies, such as SAML, Liberty Alliance, OpenID, WS-FED [36], or OAuth
[37]. Furthermore, [5, 38] also identify that the federation of identities maintained
by the multiple cloud service providers is critical for cloud-based service
composition and application integration. Both works emphasize that the trust
relation setup between cloud providers should be automatically established in order
to reach a more scalable and flexible model that can meet cloud computing
demands.
For these reasons, there is a growing body of work dealing with various cloud
computing identity issues. The European Network and Information Security Agency
(ENISA) published a series of guidelines regarding security [39], identifying
‘‘building trust on the cloud’’ as an immediate and interesting research direction.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [40] and the Cloud
Security Alliance (CSA) [41] are working on document drafts about security
recommendations for the cloud, both considering identity and trust as key issues.
Also, many other standardization organisms and research initiatives have recently
included identity federation as an indispensable mechanism in its use-cases
documents and whitepapers [6–8]. Apart from these emerging initiatives, current
related work consists basically of recommendations and surveys regarding how to
address identity management and trust issues in the cloud [5, 42–44].
However, there are still few concrete proposals and the existing ones tackle only
a subset of the identity, trust and risk problems. Between the most relevant [45],
Fig. 5 Security and privacy risk surface for Left: all possible combinations of confidentiality and
authentication risk values; Right: all possible combinations of integrity and authentication risk values
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explores the concept of federation between clouds, but they assume that previous
static trust relationships between providers exist based on Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI) and digital certificates. There are also a few research papers considering
identity management integration in the cloud landscape [46, 47], but they are still
preliminary works on requirements analyses or high level architectures.
To summarize, most of the papers on the topic that can be found in the literature
simply state that risk should be taken into account in the decision making processes
for the establishment of federated trust relationships. Nevertheless, works defining
how to assess risk are scarce and the nature of the current proposals is mainly
qualitative.
As far as our work is concerned in [10], we made a comparative analysis of the
underlying trust models in the current identity federation frameworks, which led us
to assert that dynamic secure federation is not possible nowadays. Thus, we made a
first proposal that consisted of adding new components and protocols so that entities
could gather information and make dynamic decisions in real time.
Since then, increasing interest has developed around the possibility of ad-hoc
dynamic federations, which can be derived from the recent specification released by
the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) [48].
In [11], we extend the generic trust management model called PTM (Pervasive
Trust Management) [49]—that was focused on limited devices—to include risk
management, online reputations, and SLA (Service Level Agreement) negotiations.
The proposal here, based on this previous research, it is focused on federated
infrastructures and is the unique work on risk management in the different phases of
a federation. We have extended our ideas based on the understanding that risk
assessment is vital when making decisions in uncertain environments. The
methodology and initial metrics presented in this paper will be used to implement
a risk calculation module and complete a prototype entity capable of engaging in
dynamic federations.
8 Conclusions and Future Work
In order to overcome the limitations of the current static features of FIM systems
and contribute to allow the global scalability required for the success of cloud
computing, it is required to define new trust models that allow the dynamic creation
of federations. So, since risk evaluation is a vital component for this purpose, it must
be considered as a key enabler to foster collaboration between previously unknown
parties. The work presented here contains several unique contributions. First, we
provide a novel taxonomy that reflects Federated Identity Management as a two-
phased procedure, encompassing both bootstrap and evolution stages. This
innovative distinction will help in the identification of risks involved at each phase
and can be used as a central piece to define risk metrics that are relevant for
quantification. Second, a set of initial metrics has been introduced that are useful to
compute risk. Furthermore, a hierarchical aggregation system has been proposed
and an illustrative application of risk computation in cloud computing scenarios has
been described.
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In future work, our main goal is to derive a more extensive set of metrics and
provide not only a semantic description but also the detailed numerical values. The
whole risk model based on these metrics will be used as part of the decision making
procedures in dynamic federated environments. Thus, the derived risk calculation
module will be used, together with the extensions proposed in [10], to complete a
prototype entity capable of engaging in dynamic federations.
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